We find that younger generations in Sweden demand more social insurance compared with the older generations, although program rules have been constant for decades. The trend is strong, almost one % point higher take up per cohort, and robust across demographic groups. These trends in behavior are mirrored in attitudes toward benefit uptake in a broad set of countries, including Sweden. Younger generations have a more relaxed attitude toward claiming public benefits. Our findings indicate that younger generations demand more from the welfare state, and our behavioral data from Sweden quantify the speed at which demand is increasing. (JEL codes: H31, I18, J22, Z13).
Introduction
We use the introduction of the welfare state in Sweden, arguably one of the largest social experiments of the past century, to evaluate how the demand for social insurance could adapt in the long run to this institutional setting. Although program rules have been constant for decades we observe that young generations demand more welfare state services than older generations. The pattern indicates a long run dynamic adaptation in behavior.
Long-term adjustments of behavior to the welfare state have been discussed by for example Lindbeck (1995) , who suggests that both supply and demand of welfare state services may adjust over time. These discussions have been formalized into theoretical models, for example Weibull (1999, 2003) , but empirical support of these mechanisms is scarce. We provide evidence on dynamic adjustments of the demand for social insurance benefits. Our question is related to studies of 'welfare cultures', such as Bertrand et al. (2000) , which study spatial influences on the take up of welfare benefits in the USA. Yet, our analysis is distinct from these spatial mechanisms, as we focus on adjustments in demand across time and generations. We are much closer to the analysis of cultural transmission, surveyed in the recent handbook chapter by Bisin and Verdier (2010) , which also focus on the dynamics of behavior. Although this literature emphasizes the dynamics of behavior most of ß The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com the evidence is based on cross-sectional comparisons. Models such as Bisin and Verdier (2004) as well as Lindbeck et al. (1999 Lindbeck et al. ( , 2003 predict that demand for social insurance may increase until an equilibrium with high take up is reached, but there hasn't been much evidence of such effects. Hence, our empirical study of the dynamic adaptation is an important contribution to this literature.
The take up rate of sick leave benefits have been increasing over time as seen in Figure 1 . 1 Another cut of the data shows that the increased take up is not uniform across the population. There is a pronounced increase in take up rates across generations, with young generations having much higher take up rates compared to those born earlier. As shown in Figure 2 , the generation born in 1920 has an average take up rate of 45%, that is, they use sick leave benefits a bit less than half the years they are in the labor force. For the generation born 1960 the take up rate is almost 80%. Note that we observe older generations later in their life cycle when their health may be worse, so we might have expected to see higher take up rates for older generations compared to the younger. The averages suggest that each younger birth cohort has a take up rate that is almost 1% point higher than those born one year earlier.
We are able to isolate the demand for social insurance benefits by studying a program where the decision to take up benefits is entirely demand determined. We focus on the take up of sick leave benefits in Sweden. What sets the program apart is the individual discretion in claiming benefits. For the first week of each spell it is up to the individual to determine if he is fit to work or not, all he has to do to collect the benefits is to pick up the phone.
2 The program has the same basic structure as any social insurance program, it pays out benefits in some states of the world. What makes the program particularly suited for study is the lack of supply side constraints. The program is like a giant 'marshmallow test' 3 and we study what happens to behavior as new generations enter the labor force. On the eight day of the spell he has to get a validation from a physician of his inability to work, but this monitoring does not directly affect the choice to take up some benefits.
3
The term refers to the experiment where a group of 4-year-olds were given one marshmallow and promised another, only if they could wait 20 min before eating the first one.
The study of behavior in Sweden is complemented by an analysis of attitudes toward benefit uptake in Sweden and 94 other countries. The attitudes in this broad set of countries reflect the same pattern as the behavior in Sweden. Younger generations are more accepting toward claiming government benefits compared with older generations. The findings regarding behavior and attitudes paint a picture of increasing demands on the welfare state. Such trends have fiscal implications. It would be hard to maintain program rules and benefits within a given budget, as in the long run individuals would demand more benefits.
The next section presents the sick leave program in Sweden, followed by the section describing the data. In Section 4 we present our findings regarding behavior in Sweden. The attitudes toward benefit uptake in broad set of countries are analyzed in Section 5. In the final section we discuss our findings.
The sick leave program
Sweden has a generous publicly run sick leave insurance program that covers lost earnings in the case of basically any injury or illness.
5 It is very easy to claim the benefits. For the first week of each spell, the law gives the individual the discretion to determine if he is fit to work or not. If he wants to claim the sick leave benefits he makes two phone calls, one to the social insurance office and one to his employer. 6 There is no fixed allocation of sick leave days, you can use the insurance as long as your sickness requires and for as many spells as you like. For spells up to 7 days the individual himself determines if he is fit to work. For spells longer than 7 days it is required that a physician validates your condition.
7 Monitoring of actual sickness is very light, at least in part due to the difficulty in verifying conditions like stomach ache and back pain.
The program is similar to any social insurance. It pays out benefits if the individual is hit by some shock. In the sick leave program it is a health shock, while unemployment benefits cover unemployment shocks and pensions pay out based on age. What sets the sick leave program apart is the level of individual discretion with respect to claiming benefits. The decision to claim benefits rests entirely with the individual, and observed take up behavior is purely driven by the demand for benefits.
5
In comparison to the USA the program encompasses both 'personal days' provided in employment contracts (although restricted to sick leave) and the workers' compensation program.
The rules governing sick leave insurance have been remarkably constant over the [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period. The sick leave program was first passed into law in 1962 (SFS 1962:381) and it took effect in 1963. Data on sick leave are available from 1974, when sick leave benefits became taxable income.
8
The replacement rate for lost earnings due to sickness was set to 90%. The daily benefit is calculated as 90% of normal annual labor earnings divided by 365, up to a cap. The replacement cap is indexed to the so called base amount, which is related to inflation. About 93% of the incomes are below the cap, and 6% of the sick leave observations are above the cap.
Benefits can be claimed from the second day of the sickness spell. The definition of the second day is, however, quite generous. It is sufficient to call in sick before leaving work and that day counts as the first day of the spell. If you think you will be sick tomorrow you can always call in sick today and the first unpaid day is of no consequence, and if it turns out that you are fit for work tomorrow you can change your mind. Spells shorter than 7 days do not pay benefits on weekends. This system was in place until 1987. From 1988 through 1990 the first day of no coverage was abolished.
9,10
Most sick leave spells are short, about 95% are shorter than one month (Source: Fo¨rsa¨kringskassan). You need to have earnings for 6 months in order to qualify for the sick leave benefits and be less than 65 years of age. The program is universal and it is administered by the central government and does not depend on your employer. Benefits are financed through a flat pay roll tax.
Data
We use registry data on individual panels over the period 1974-1990. 11 The data draw information from several sources; demographic information from the population registry, income information from the tax authorities, and various public benefits from the social insurance administration. Our main variable of interest, participation in the sick leave programs, is defined based on observing positive sick leave benefits during the year. We use a random sample of the 1974 population who we follow for 17 years. 12 We include the birth cohorts from 1917 to 1963. About 3% of the population is sampled.
8
The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1973:465. 9 The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1987:223. 10 Reforms in the 1990s make the later data hard to compare to the period we study.
11
The analysis ends in 1990 since later reforms make the data hard to compare.
12
The only sampled individuals that disappear from the data are those who die or emigrate.
CESifo Economic Studies, 57, 4/2011 609 Trends in Behavior and Attitudes Individuals are included in the analysis from ages 22 to 60. The age restrictions are due to the looser connection to the labor market of individuals at the tails of the life cycle. The young may still be studying and may not have a firm foot in the labor market. At ages close to retirement individuals face a number of incentives to leave the labor force that we study here, and we choose to exclude those observations. Since the sick leave program is designed to replace lost labor earnings, we restrict the analysis to individuals who are labor force participants.
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For data on attitudes toward benefit uptake we use the integrated European Values Survey and World Values Survey (EVS/WVS). For the attitudes we focus on the survey covers 95 countries for up to five waves. The first wave was conducted in 1981-1984 and the last wave was in 2005-2006. 14 4 Demand for social insurance
In this section, we trace out the participation rates in the sick leave program for different demographic groups. We do not find that one particular group is driving the result in Figure 2 . We find that the trend is present across demographic groups and represents a broad shift in behavior across generations.
The averages in Figure 2 could capture life cycle patterns. For example, young generations are observed when they have young children that may make them take more sick leave during those years. 15 In Figure 3 , we plot the average take up by age for four different cohorts where we can compare cohorts at the same stage in the life cycle. Men are plotted in the left panel and women on the right. The striking pattern is how the younger generations are shifted up to higher levels of take up across the life cycle. The pattern is particularly pronounced for women. We do not observe sharp drops in the life cycle profiles of benefit take up, indicating that life cycle patterns do not drive the cohort trend in Figure 2 .
Deteriorating health for younger cohorts could be an explanation for the cohort trend. Measures of health outcomes, however, paint a different picture. Younger cohorts have improved health along objective measures. Expected remaining longevity at age 20 increased by 1.76 years for men and 2.16 years for women between the early 1970s and the late 1980s. The occurrence of heart problems has decreases as well. For the 45-64 age 13 Labor force participation is defined as having positive labor earnings during the year. 14 We use the data issue from 14 September 2009. 15 There are at least two causes for this. Parents may use the sick leave program to take care of sick children, or sick children make the parents sick.
group the average rate of heart problems during 1980-1982 was 5.0%. These problems had decreased to 3.2% in the 1990-1992 period (Source: Statistics Sweden). The fraction of the population 16-84 that report that their health status is generally good has increased slightly from 74 to 75% between 1980 and 1990. Cancer mortality has decreased across cohorts. Among 30-to 34-year-old women in the late 1960s the mortality of cancer was 21 per 100 000 persons. In the early 1990s the rate had dropped to 13.5. The corresponding rates for men were 16.7 and 11.2. Reductions in mortality rates are seen at most points in the age distribution across cohorts (Source: NORDCAN). The improvements in the health conditions across cohorts make the sick leave trends more surprising.
We find that the trend toward more take up is visible across our four education groups. The pattern is strongest for the groups with some college and less education. This is our first piece of evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the trend toward higher take up across generations is common across demographic groups. The alternative hypothesis would be that the pattern in Figure 2 is driven by some strata of the population. One example of the alternative hypothesis would be that the behavior is driven by 'welfare cultures', where pockets of the population experience rapid increases of benefit take up. Such behavior has been studied regarding welfare take up in the USA by Bertrand et al. (2000) and in Sweden by Edin et al. (2003) . We do not find any support of that hypothesis across education groups as seen in Figure 4 , for example that the low educated drive the trend, and we examine other groups below. Another potential explanation is that immigrants, who may have a different attitude toward claiming social insurance benefits, drive the aggregate behavior. Immigrants are on average born later, and we could just pick up their behavior in Figure 2 . In Figure 5 , we plot the take up rates for individuals born in Sweden (natives) and those born outside Sweden (immigrants). The average take up rates are a little higher for most cohorts of immigrants, but we see that the underlying trend toward higher take up is present for both groups. The differences in behavior is getting smaller for younger cohorts, indicating convergence in behavior across the groups. Hence, immigrants cannot explain the trend in Figure 2 .
It would also be possible that the increased urbanization is a factor behind the trend in Figure 2 . Individuals who live in larger cities may be more anonymous compared with the country side. Individuals in small communities where most people know each other may be more subjected to the norm to support oneself and not to live off government benefits. 16 The trend in sick leave behavior could be driven by the Years 1974 Years -1990 As discussed by for example Elster (1989) . urbanization, as urbanization is driven by younger generations moving to larger cities. We split the sample into two groups. If the individual lives in a municipality with a population above the mean municipality, he is classified as urban. If he is not we classify him as rural. The take up rates are hardly distinguishable across the two groups ( Figure 6 ). This is evidence against the urbanization hypothesis, the trend is clearly present both for urban and rural areas. The sick leave insurance is particularly well suited for studying the demand for social insurance as discussed above. Next we turn to the unemployment insurance program. The take up rate across cohorts is increasing as seen in Figure 7 , but the shape is more exponential than the linear trend we see in the sick leave program. The unemployment insurance trend is harder to interpret as both demand and supply play a role. It may be that the labor markets the different cohorts face have changed. It could be that the employment opportunities are more fickle for the younger cohorts, who have experienced increased separation rates and decreased matching rates in the labor market. Such labor market 'turbulence' would of course affect the averages. The pattern in Figure 7 regarding unemployment insurance take up is consistent with the increasing demand for social insurance we observe in the sick leave program. 
Attitudes toward benefit uptake
In this section, we examine if the trends in behavior displayed in the previous section are mirrored in attitudes toward benefit uptake in Sweden and other countries. We use data from the integrated EVS/ WVS. We focus on the attitudes toward claiming government benefits one is not entitled to. The question is phrased as 'Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, to claim government benefits to which you are not entitled?' Answers range from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. The question captures one margin on which attitudes may change, which may translate into the behavior observed in Sweden. It is of course possible that the observed behavior is Sweden is the result of other changes, for example shifts in what people think they are entitled to or that it takes a long time to learn about the benefits offered. It is also possible that some of the behavioral shift is due to changes in attitudes toward claiming benefits one is not entitled to. For this reason it is an interesting margin to study.
The econometric model we estimate is that the attitude toward claiming benefits depends on individual and aggregate factors. We denote the attitude of an individual i in year t by A i,t . The main variable of interest is year of birth, which we may denote YOB i while other individual are captured by the vector X i,t . The model may be written as
where C j represents the country fixed effect for country j and S t is the survey wave fixed effect, and " i,t is the random error term. The model is estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). 17 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
Regressing the attitude toward claiming benefits on the year of birth in Sweden yields a positive and significant estimate, that is, younger generations think it is more justified to claim benefits compared to the older generations. The point estimate, 0.02, is highly significant. 18 The result is virtually identical when we add controls for demographic factors, labor market attachment, and income groups as seen in Table 2 . It is the same relationship we saw in behavior in Figure 2 . The finding indicates that part of the explanation for the behavioral shift could be a change in attitudes. Figure 7 Unemployment insurance participation rate. sample: Labor force participants, ages 22-60. Years 1974 22-60. Years -1990 We choose the pooled OLS model since the estimated coefficients are straightforward to interpret. Results in the following two tables are robust to using ordered logit or ordered probit models.
We find that pattern of attitudes in Sweden hold for a broad set of countries. In Table 3 we present the estimates for the 95 countries in the EVS/WVS for which the same question has been asked. In the first specification in Table 3 we estimate the simple correlation between attitudes toward benefits and the year of birth. The point estimate, 0.0153, is similar to what we estimated in Sweden. 19 As there may be large differences across countries and time, we add country fixed effects and survey wave fixed effects in Specification 2. The point estimate is not affected much, but it is now more precisely estimated. Adding the demographic dummy variables do not influence the estimate on year of birth. Higher education, as well as being married and female, are associated with less approval of claiming benefits. The result is also robust to controlling for labor market attachment and income groups (10 different categories). 20 We may note that those working full time and the self employed are more disapproving of claiming benefits one is not entitled to.
21
Culture has been argued to affect attitudes and behavior, see for example Guiso et al. (2006) and Fernandez (2007) . In the context of unemployment benefits Bruegger et al. (2010) argue that languages encapsulate The drop in the number of observations in Specification (4) is due to missing data on income. The results are very similar if we drop the income controls.
Full time employment has a much more negative impact on attitudes in Sweden. http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/ different cultures. They find large behavioral differences for the speakers of Latin languages and German in Switzerland. We examine if we can find different trends in attitudes across language groups. We define three language groups; Latin, Germanic, and Anglo-Saxon. 22 We interact these country groups with the year of birth variable to estimate slopes for each of the groups. 23 The point estimate of the cohort trend for the Latin countries is slightly lower than the other two groups, potentially Notes: The dependent variable is the answer to the question 'Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, to claim government benefits to which you are not entitled?' Answers range from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. Income group effects are dummies for 10 income categories. Estimated by pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by birth cohort. Bold added for emphasis.
indicating that the Latin countries are closer to a stationary state in attitudes across generations. The differences across the language groups are, however, not statistically significant.
24
Sixty percent of the respondents answer that it is never justifiable to claim government benefits one is not entitled to. It would hence be informative to contrast this group to those who think it is sometimes justifiable. We create an indicator variable that takes on the value one Notes: The dependent variable is the answer to the question 'Do you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, to claim government benefits to which you are not entitled?' Answers range from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. Income group effects are dummies for 10 income categories. Estimated by pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by country. Bold added for emphasis.
We also estimated a version where the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon countries were joined in one group. The slope estimate is not significantly different from the Latin group in this specification either.
if thinks it is sometimes justifiable to claim the benefits. 25 Using this indicator as the dependent variable we run regressions similar to Table 3 above.
The attitudes toward benefit uptake across generations are similar when we compare those who sometimes think it is justified to those who never think it is justified. Younger generations are more likely to think it is sometimes justified to claim benefits one is not entitled to. Notes: The dependent variable is zero if the respondent thinks it is never justified to claim benefits one is not entitled to, and one otherwise. That is, the indicator is one if the respondent has answered in catergories 2-10 on the question. Income group effects are dummies for 10 income categories. Estimated by pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by country. Bold added for emphasis.
25
The indicator takes on the value 1 if the respondent has answered with categories 2-10, and the indicator is 0 if the respondent thinks it is never justified to claim benefits one is not entitled to. The estimates are similar across the different specifications as seen in Table 4 . 26 
Discussion
There is a robust trend toward higher demand for social insurance across generations in Sweden. The magnitude is substantial, every cohort has an almost 1% point higher take up rate of sick leave benefits. The trends in behavior in Sweden are mirrored in the trends in attitudes toward benefits in Sweden and in a broad set of countries. Younger generations more frequently think it is justified to claim government benefits one is not entitled to, compared with older generations. The trends in behavior and attitudes are consistent with a reduced stigmatization of claiming government benefits. Lindbeck et al. (1999 Lindbeck et al. ( , 2003 model a welfare state with endogenous stigma where small changes in for example the value of leisure can result in dramatically different tax and transfer policies in the long run, representing the rise and the fall of a welfare state. Bisin and Verdier (2004) model work norms in the welfare state. Their model predicts that work norms in the welfare state will weaken in the long run, which is consistent with both our evidence on behavior and attitudes. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) study how the intergenerational transmission of work norms could explain the success of capitalism during the industrial revolution, while what we observe here may be seen as a weakening of work norms across generations.
The trends we observe could also be consistent with social learning. Fernandez (2008) applies a social learning mechanism to explain the rise in female labor supply in the USA. She models a woman's choice to enter the labor force to depend on the unknown psychic cost to her not to raise her own child. By observing more women in the labor force, the individual woman has a better idea of the associated cost and more women decide to join the labor force. The decision to leave your child in the care of others has potentially large discrete costs. In contrast, the decision to take a day of sick leave is very much on the intensive margin and without apparent large costs. Furthermore, the rules and procedure for claiming sick leave are straightforward. We think social learning is a less appealing explanation in our setting.
We explore a particular mechanism to explain the trend in Figure 2 in Ljunge (2010) . We write down a model where the behavior of 'role models' affects individual decisions. We find that experience with a high take up 26 The results are qualitatively similar if we use a probit or a logit model instead of the linear probability model in Table 4. rate for the 'role model' has a substantial impact on individual's decision to claim benefits. Our estimates indicate that this mechanism could account for a majority of the younger cohorts' higher demand for benefits displayed in Figure 2 . This intertemporal approach we take is similar to Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln's (2007) study of how attitudes change after the reunification of Germany. The approach is fundamentally different from social interactions papers 27 or studies of the long run effects of institutions, which focus on spatial spill-overs that are either instantaneous or where areas have reached new stationary states. We study what happens in the transition to a new steady state, and Figure 2 quantifies the speed at which behavior is changing across generations. Data on such behavioral adaptation in the welfare state has not been studied earlier.
There are fiscal consequences of the cohort trend whatever the reasons behind it. Young generations demand more social insurance benefits. Given constant program rules the expenditures in the program are bound to increase. If program budgets are kept fixed, in real per capita terms, this cohort trend toward higher demands would require adjustments to program eligibility or program generosity, or both.
The cohort drift we document is a challenge to the fiscal sustainability of welfare state programs. The fiscal challenges of an aging population and of globalization are central in the policy debate, but the challenges from increasing demand across generations have yet to receive that kind of attention. Based on the data presented here, we believe these challenges are real and they deserve a more central role in the policy debate.
